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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior research over several decades has catalogued many factors underlying firm‟s equity 
participation in joint ventures. This analysis empirically investigates whether agency problems 
associated with monitoring specialized activities influence the negotiated distribution of equity 
between collaborating partners at the inception of an equity joint venture (EJV). The proposed 
framework modifies a financial contracting perspective based upon agency theory and draws on 
existing theories of EJVs; namely, transaction cost economics, bargaining power and resource-
based theory. The central contention is that a primary determinant of the division of equity 
capital is the requirement for each contracting partner to guarantee its subsequent value-
enhancing productive activities that jointly determine the future success of the EJV. 
Specifically, it is argued that the inherent characteristics of the expertise and/or nature of the 
strategic assets that a firm contributes to an inter-firm EJV may make it difficult for that firm to 
guarantee (ex ante) its productive contribution during the negotiation stage. Results from a 
sample of 194 UK-based EJVs support the view that owners of strategic assets whose potential 
contribution to the success of the EJV are the most difficult to measure ex ante will negotiate a 
higher share of equity capital, thereby, partially, guaranteeing their actions. 
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1. Introduction 
Within agency theory an important debate has recently emerged on the primary 
determinants of a firm‟s alliance decisions. Whilst some commentators emphasize the 
importance of variables at the transaction level of analysis (Oxley 1997; Dyer and Singh 1998; 
Koza and Lewin 1998), others point to the neglect of firm-level theories in the collaborative 
strategy literature (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Dutta and Weiss 1997; Ramanathan et al. 
1997). The latter maintain that the uncertainty surrounding co-operation among partners (Child 
and Rodrigues 2004) should be a primary area for analysis. Ramanathan et al. (1997) are 
forceful advocates of the need for greater theoretical pluralism in the existing EJV literature. In 
particular, they make the case for the use of agency theory and other related perspectives that are 
able to identify firm-level factors that may have an impact on joint venture formation, but that 
have been overlooked in the extant literature. 
 There is also a substantial amount of research devoted to theories of EJVs based on 
transaction cost economics, bargaining power and resource-based theory (Lecraw 1984; Gomes- 
Casseres 1988, 1989, 1990; Blodgett 1991; Hennart 1991; Gary and Yan 1992; Pan 1996; 
Brouthers and Bamossy 1997; Chadee and Qiu 2001). Given this substantial research base, the 
specific purpose of this paper is to offer a rationale for the empirical analysis of agency hazards 
that arise from difficulties in measuring the value-adding activities of partners and equity 
participation within the context of joint ventures. In this vein, as the EJV partners usually 
contribute complementary tangible and intangible assets to the collaboration, they, in effect, 
become agents for each other in ensuring its viability (Child and Rodrigues 2003). However, the 
mutual threat of opportunistic behaviour arising from environmental uncertainty, the principals‟ 
monitoring costs, self interest and any inconsistencies in, or conflicts over, the EJV‟s goals will 
create agency problems (Eisenhardt 1989; Bergen et al. 1992; Stump and Heide 1996; Reuer 
and Miller 1997). This paper maintains that the perceived problems that are associated with 
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opportunism will influence the governance arrangements in EJVs. In short, these problems will 
be reflected in the initial contractual specifications of the partners‟ shares of equity capital.  
The approach developed in this analysis contributes to recent debates in the strategy and 
finance literature (Lane et al. 1998, 1999; Amihud and Lev 1999; Denis et al. 1999) in relation 
to the explanatory power and appropriate domain of agency theory. Moreover, while prior 
empirical studies apply agency theory to corporate strategy or investigate corporate 
diversification in general, and/or acquisitions as a particular form of external corporate 
development, such research does not examine the specific role of strategic assets or the 
contractual provisions governing the EJV relationship that help to guarantee the value-
enhancing productive activities of partner firms.  
The theoretical links between agency problems that are created by difficulties in 
monitoring the actions of the owners of such specialized resources, and the negotiated equity 
contribution of partners to an EJV are considered. Barzel and Suen‟s (1992) and Fama‟s (1980) 
definition of a „firm‟ is extended to an EJV. That is an EJV comprises the set of contracts whose 
variability is contractually guaranteed by equity capital, weighing each contract by the share of 
its variability that is assumed by the equity capital. The EJV, therefore, incorporates a nexus of 
outcome guarantees. This definition enables a distinction to be drawn between equity ownership 
and control of EJV. Barzel and Suen, (1992, 1997) and Grossman and Hart (1986) maintain that, 
when analysing inter-firm collaboration, such as an EJV, the greater the difficulty in measuring 
one firm‟s contribution to the value of output with respect to the other, the greater the 
opportunity for the former to engage in opportunistic behaviour. In order to maximize the value 
of such collaborations, financial contracting theory demonstrates that, as a firm‟s inclination, to 
affect the outcome rises, such a firm should be contractually allocated more of the variability of 
the joint action (Hart 1995). The term inclination indicates a firm‟s actions given its assets, skill 
and most importantly, the contractual constraints it faces. In this context, bearing outcome 
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variability is analogous to having a claim to the equity residual, and is tantamount to a firm 
guaranteeing its own actions. 
This paper examines whether agency theory can be applied as a firm-level perspective to 
help explain the negotiated division of equity capital between partners in EJVs. The central 
contention here is that a primary determinant of the division of equity capital is the requirement 
for each contracting partner to guarantee its subsequent value-enhancing productive activities 
that collectively determine the future returns to the EJV. Specifically, it is argued that the 
inherent characteristics of the expertise and/or nature of the strategic assets that a firm 
contributes to an inter-firm EJV will often make it difficult for that firm to guarantee ex ante its 
future productive contribution during the negotiation stage. The EJV‟s commitment to co-own 
the venture in accordance with the negotiated equity share provides a mechanism for distributing 
residuals when complex ex ante contractual agreements cannot be written to specify or enforce a 
division of returns accurately reflecting a firm‟s value-enhancing contribution (Teece 1992). 
Thus, negotiating equity shares can be interpreted as a mechanism that provides a contractual 
manifestation of the EJV partners‟ arrangement for mitigating opportunism. The proposed 
framework is tested empirically, and corroborated by analysing a sample of 194 partner firms 
from EJVs located in the UK. However, it should be noted that the theoretical foundations in 
this paper could apply equally to domestic EJVs. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines why both the 
strategic resources of the firms and their position in the value chain would have an effect on 
equity participation shares of the EJV partners and specifies the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses 
the empirical proxies used to measure the extent of strategic asset contribution and the other 
firm-level factors that may influence the equity contribution of an EJV partner. Section 4 sets 
out methodology, data source and sample. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5, and 
Section 6 concludes.  
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2. The Determinant of Equity Contribution 
2.1 Strategic Assets and Equity Guarantees 
Resource-based theory stresses the importance of the unique and inimitable 
characteristic of assets (resources, skills, relationships and investment) as the primary sources of 
a firm‟s competitive advantage (Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988; 
Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Barney 1991; Rumelt 1991; Peteraf 1993; Tsang 2000; Luo 2002). 
Assets specifically tailored to the firm‟s strategy and technology can reduce costs, improve 
quality and enable the firm to differentiate its products and services from those of its 
competitors. These specific assets, especially intangible assets, such as R&D, brand names and 
other reputational investments, are difficult for outsiders to measure and evaluate. It is well 
documented that these assets are also less „redeployable‟ to other uses than general purpose 
assets, and secondary markets for such assets may not value them as much as the original firm, 
and may not even exist (Williamson 1975, 1985; Klein et al. 1978).  
Resources may also be valuable as they arise from complex and ambiguous processes 
that are difficult, even for insiders, to identify. Moreover, these so-called opaque resources are 
also difficult to manage because the input they provide is only partially controllable and 
verifiable. Opaque assets are a class of productive assets that due either to their nature or to the 
owning firm‟s actions, possess a value that cannot be easily measured as a result of relevant 
information not being communicated or difficulty in outsiders imitating their contribution 
(Vicente-Lorente 2001). Therefore, it is not only the valuation of these assets that creates 
measurement costs to a potential EJV partner of such a firm, but also the 
transferability/transparency of such assets. Asset specificity and/or opacity are important 
because of their impact on the efficiency of alternative governance structures and the threat of 
opportunism. Opportunism occurs because firms may have difficulty writing complete contracts 
or evaluating the performance of partner resources (Williamson 1991). Transaction cost 
economics (TCE) maintains that contractual incompleteness exposes parties who invest in 
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relationship-specific assets to potential opportunism (Williamson 1975, 1985, 1995; Klein et al. 
1978; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990). If circumstances change, their trading 
partners may try to expropriate the rents accruing to the specific assets. One way to safeguard 
those rents is through integration, whereby partners merge and eliminate adversarial interests. 
Less extreme options include reciprocal buying arrangements in which each party agrees to a 
mutual exchange of „hostages‟ and initiating shared ownership agreements such as EJVs. TCE 
argues that firms may resort to equity-based agreements in order to economize on transactions 
costs when there is non-negligible risk of opportunism (Hennart 1988; Kogut 1988; Williamson 
1991). Accordingly, authors inspired by TCE contend that equity-based institutional forms are 
more suited to complex alliances (that is, those that link together several partners and/or have 
broad scope in terms of their product, technology, or activity) and for alliances that have a 
technological component. With respect to this latter category of alliances, equity modes are 
alleged to allow firms to deal more effectively with contractual and appropriability hazards 
inherent in the development, transfer, and exploitation of technological knowledge, due to the 
incentive alignment properties of shared ownership (the superior monitoring and control 
mechanisms). Previous empirical studies generally lend support to such a perspective (Pisano et 
al. 1988; Pisano 1989; Osborne and Baughn 1990; Gulati 1995; Garcia Canal 1996; Oxley 
1997; Gulati and Singh 1998; Oxley 1999). This paper complements those studies by focussing 
upon the costs of monitoring the input contribution of EJV partners in the presence of strategic 
assets. This is then used as a basis for predicting their respective equity contributions.  
From the above, it is reasonable to infer that if the measurement of the value of a 
strategic asset in a particular use is problematic, providers of such assets in the EJV may become 
residual claimants to the value of the activity to guarantee their actions. This equity capital 
guarantee will then serve as a partial inducement to the EJV partner to undertake an alliance. 
Moreover, the analysis predicts that an efficient EJV contractual format will allocate a relatively 
smaller equity share to that partner (i) whose assets are less strategic in nature, or (ii) can more 
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easily and cost-effectively guarantee its productive contribution to the value of EJV, owing to 
the fact its asset contribution is more tangible and easily measurable. 
 
2.2 Location in the Value Chain, Measurement and Contracting 
Another consideration relevant to the contractual relationship is the position of the 
partners in the value chain. One of the central and most investigated proposition in TCE 
concerns a class of adaptation problems resulting from the potential for hold-up in vertical 
relationships (Shelanski and Klein 1995; Masten 2002; David and Han 2004). When 
procurement must be supported by dedicated (relationship-specific) investments, the anticipated 
costs of the transaction increase. This is because dedicated investments by one partner create 
scope for the other to renegotiate the contract opportunistically when circumstances change. By 
organizing such transactions under common ownership, muted incentives, enhanced monitoring, 
and the threat of sanctions can limit opportunistic behaviour and can facilitate co-operative 
adaptation (Williamson 1985).  
Baker et al.‟s (2002) analysis of relational contracting shows how and why vertical 
relational contracts within firms differ from those between firms (non-integration). They argue 
that the downstream party would like the upstream firm to undertake actions that improve the 
value of the good in the downstream production process, and focus on two classes of actions: 
those that are unobservable (moral hazard) and those that are observable, but not verifiable (non-
contractibility). In such a setting, relational contracts can encourage value-enhancing actions: the 
downstream party can promise to pay the upstream party a „bonus‟ if the latter produces a good 
of high quality. As this promise is based on non-contractible outcomes, it provides incentives to 
the upstream party only if it is self-enforcing (that is, the short-run value of reneging must be less 
than the long-run value of the relationship). Given conflicting incentives (resource and 
bargaining position), Baker et al. (2002) argue that asset ownership affects the partners‟ 
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temptation to renege on a contract, and hence affects the best relational contract the partners can 
sustain.  
Under integration, if the downstream party reneges on the bonus, they still own the good. 
But under non-integration, if the downstream party reneges on the bonus, they cannot use the 
good without buying it for at least its value in its alternative use. Non-integration will give the 
upstream party more resources if the downstream party reneges on the promised bonus. But non-
integration has a drawback: it creates an incentive for the upstream party to increase the value of 
the good in its alternative use, in order to improve their bargaining position with the downstream 
party. The underlying point is that the upstream party can be incentivized more easily than the 
downstream party via contracts or ex-post measurement. It is argued here that this phenomenon 
also has implications for the contractual relationship between partners in a vertical EJV. The 
downstream party performs second and, therefore, is better positioned to measure the output 
quality of upstream party which is performing first. Therefore, the downstream partner would be 
expected to provide a larger share of equity capital, as it must guarantee its own actions. 
The central proposition here maintains that the extent to which each partner is required to 
provide equity capital-related guarantees at the contractual formation stage of an EJV will be 
determined by both the strategic nature of their asset contribution and their location in the value 
chain. This generates the complementary sets of testable hypotheses, outlined below. 
 
H1a. A partner firm in an EJV will have a larger share of the equity capital, as the relative 
specificity and/or opacity (strategic nature) of the assets contributed by that firm increases.  
  
H1b. Given a firm’s strategic asset contribution to a vertical EJV in relation to that of its 
partner, a firm will have a larger share of the equity capital if it is downstream than if it is 
upstream. 
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H2a. A partner firm in an EJV is more likely to contribute a smaller share of the equity capital, 
as the tangibility (collateral value) of that partner’s assets increases.  
 
H2b. A downstream partner firm in a vertical EJV is more likely to contribute a larger share of 
the equity capital for a given degree of tangibility of that partner’s assets in relation to the assets 
of the upstream partner firm. 
 
3. The Empirical Measurement of Strategic Assets  
Testing the hypotheses outlined above requires the construction of proxies for an EJV 
partner‟s strategic assets that are amenable to data analysis. Drawing on previous studies, this 
paper initially proxies the specificity and/or opacity of assets using two variables; namely the 
ratio of R&D expenses to total sales (RDS) and the ratio of cost of sales to total sales (SES). 
Previous studies use R&D intensity as a proxy for intangible assets which are assumed to be 
more strategic in nature than tangible assets (Bradley et al. 1984; Titman and Wessels 1988; 
Balakrishnan and Fox 1993; Vicente-Lorente 2001). The ratio of advertising expenses to net 
sales has also been used as a proxy for firm-specific assets (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Bradley 
et al. 1984). Titman and Wessels (1988) also include the quit rate, and the percentage of the 
industry‟s total work force that voluntarily left their jobs in the sample years. However, it has 
not been possible to obtain data for advertising expenses or quit rates for all the firms in the 
sample. As the hypotheses predict an increased probability of an enhanced equity contribution 
as the specificity and/or opacity of the assets contributed by a partner increases, a positive sign 
on these variables in the ensuing multinomial logit regressions is expected. This reflects the 
maintained hypothesis; namely, that equity serves as a performance guarantee when a partner‟s 
productive efforts cannot be measured easily. It is, however, noted that employing the variable 
SES in the regressions as a proxy for strategic assets generates no statistically significant results. 
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Therefore, the estimates are not reported. (They can, however, be obtained from the 
corresponding author on request.) 
Among the measures used to proxy specific human capital (SHC), employee turnover 
and tenure have often been previously employed in the literature (Titman 1984; Titman and 
Wessels 1988). Tenure is discarded because an aggregate measure of human capital per firm is 
needed. The turnover per employee is calculated as the ratio of total sales to the total number of 
employees. This proxy is used as a measure of the productive efficiency of the firm, with more 
productive firms postulated to have more specific human capital. Once again a positive 
relationship with equity share is expected as it captures another difficult to measure strategic 
asset and, therefore, increases the likelihood of a larger equity contribution.  
The proxies for the tangibility of assets incorporate the results of Balakrishnan and Fox 
(1993), Titman and Wessels (1988). Much empirical research on capital structure considers that 
tangible assets serve as collateral, enabling their owner firms to obtain better credit conditions 
from lenders. In addition, the extent of tangible assets appears to be negatively related to 
liquidation costs (Alderson and Betker 1996). The analysis incorporates two indicators for the 
collateral value attribute (Bradley et al. 1984; Titman and Wessels 1988; Harris and Raviv 1991; 
Rajan and Zingales 1995). These are the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (TAS) and the ratio of 
gross plant and equipment to total assets (GPQ). In calculating the variable GPQ, the inventory 
cost is omitted from the estimation due to the unavailability of relevant data for firms in the 
sample. The expected sign for these variables is negative, indicating an inverse relationship 
between the tangibility of assets and the extent of equity contribution.  
In addition, the debt/equity ratio of the firm relative to its respective industry average is 
considered. Debt/equity ratios for an industry are obtained, given its four-digit SIC code, from 
the industry review section of Investor Reuters Database. (In the few instances where there was 
no exact industry match on the database for the firm‟s four-digit SIC code, the most suitable 
substitute was used. This took into account, first, the three-digit SIC code and, if there was still 
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no match, the two-digit SIC code.) The importance of this industry ratio for the analysis is that it 
is necessary to control for the influence of variation in the technical dependence on strategic 
assets for firms across different industries as a determinant of EJV equity shares. The 
debt/equity ratio for the firms is calculated using the accounting definition; namely, the ratio of 
the book value of total debt to the book value of total debt plus the market value of equity. The 
expected sign for this variable in the regressions is negative suggesting highly leveraged partner 
firms are also likely to contribute less of the equity capital in EJVs. This follows the high levels 
of debt in the capital structure of the firm suggest use of collateral to obtain lower premium to 
service the debt and to reduce the cost of borrowing. 
To control for the measurement impacts and opportunistic potential of a firm‟s relative 
position in the value chain, a distinction is drawn in the empirical work between horizontal and 
vertical EJV. If EJV partners are in different lines of business, making complementary inputs 
(vertical) to the venture, it is contended above that it is easier, relatively, to incentivize the 
upstream firm through contractual provisions and post-production measurement of their 
contribution to value added. This reduces the necessity for upstream partner firms to provide an 
equity-capital guarantee. For empirical implementation, the upstream/downstream distinction for 
vertical EJVs is achieved by grouping the firms into their respective industries given their four-
digit SIC codes, and comparing the second digit of their respective codes. If that code differs (is 
identical) the EJV is designated to be a vertical (horizontal) EJV. For example an EJV between a 
UK firm with an SIC code of 4813 „telephone communications‟ and a foreign firm with SIC 
code of 4911 „electric services‟ is considered to be a vertical EJV. However, an EJV between a 
UK firm with a SIC code of 3674 „semiconductors and related devices‟ and a foreign with a SIC 
code of 3661 „communication equipment‟ is an example of a horizontal EJV. In order to test 
hypotheses 1b and 2b, the dummy variable UPS is constructed. The set of EJV partners forming 
vertical relationships is considered, and, on the basis of the SIC codes of each partner, it is 
possible to determine which partner performs first in the chain of production. A dummy variable 
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UPS is then allocated, designated 1 for downstream partners and 0 otherwise. The predicted sign 
for this variable is positive indicating that downstream partner is likely to contribute a larger 
share of the equity capital, ceteris paribus. Overall, it is both the location of a partner in a 
vertical EJV, as well as their asset characteristics that determines the level of equity contribution 
by that partner. 
 
3.1 Other Factors Influencing the Equity Contribution 
This section outlines the controls – that is, other firm-level factors that may influence 
equity shares – that are used in this study to avoid unwarranted attribution of equity share 
determinants to strategic assets. With reference to the financial economics literature, a number of 
potential firm-level drivers are specified that are highlighted in this literature as important 
determinants of capital structure and the mode of financing. These factors, their expected sign, 
and the empirical measures used here, which have been determined on the basis of the referenced 
prior literature, are:  
 Dependency on external finance, EXFN, (+). The literature specifies technological 
reasons why some industries depend more on external financing than others. EXFN is 
defined as the ratio of capital expenditure minus cash flow from operations to capital 
expenditure (Rajan and Zingales 1998).
 
Note that this definition includes changes in the 
non-financial components of net working capital as part of funds from operations. In 
fact, in certain businesses these represent major sources (or uses) of funds that help a 
firm avoid (or force it to tap) external sources of funds. 
 Non-debt tax shields, NDTX, (-). Non-debt tax shields are associated with capital 
equipment and depreciation and are a potential indicator of non-strategic resources. 
NDTX is measured by the ratio of depreciation to total assets (DeAngelo and Masulis 
1980; Titman and Wessels 1988). 
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 Future growth potential, GRT, (+). Growth options are capital assets that add value to a 
firm, but can not be easily collateralized. As firms generally engage in R&D to generate 
future investment and growth options, the ratio of R&D to net sales also serves as an 
indicator of growth potential. GRT is proxied by the ratio of capital expenditure to total 
assets (Bhandari 1983; Titman and Wessels 1988; Fama and French 1992; Rajan and 
Zingales 1995). 
 Firm size, LSAL, (-). Size considerations mainly impact smaller firms and leverage 
ratios appear to be (inversely) related to firm size. LSAL is defined as the natural 
logarithm of sales (Warner 1977; Ang et al. 1982; Titman and Wessels 1988). 
 Earnings Variability, CHOI, (+). A firm‟s optimal debt level is a decreasing function of 
the variability of its earnings. CHOI is measured as the percentage change in operating 
income between the pre-EJV and the year EJV is formed (Barton and Gordon 1988; 
Titman and Wessels 1988; Balakrishnan and Fox 1993). 
 Profitability, PRF, (+). „Pecking order theory‟ (Myers and Majluf 1984) predicts that 
profitability will be negatively related to leverage because of the advantages associated 
with internal financing. PRF is measured by the ratio of operating income to net sales 
(Barton and Gordon, 1988; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
 
4. Methodology and Sample Description 
4.1 Specification of the Model 
The negotiated level of equity contribution between partners in an EJV is determined at 
the EJV‟s formation. As such, the dependent variable assumes only a single value for each EJV 
partner in the sample, so the determinants of the observed negotiated equity shares are estimated 
using cross-sectional, multinomial logistic regressions. Logistic regression is a standard and 
commonly observed estimation method utilized in studies of ownership strategies (Gomes-
Casseres 1990; Hennart 1991). The definition of the dependent variable follows the studies by 
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Hu and Chen (1993) and Pan (1996). Minority and majority equity contributions are 
distinguished through the use of a categorical dependent variable, with EJV partners with less 
than 50 per cent, and more than 50 per cent, equity shares categorized as minority and majority 
contributors, respectively. Those EJVs where partners each contribute 50 per cent equity are 
categorized as equal contributors. On the basis of this classification, the dependent variable is a 
multinomial categorical discrete dummy variable, which assumes a value of 0 for minority, 1 for 
equal, and 2 for majority contributors, respectively. We proceed by estimating the following 
multinomial logit model: 
Uji = `zit + it and for j=1, 2,…, J: 
Pr (Y = 0) = 
J
K
xike
1
`
1
1
  Pr (Y = j) = 
J
K
x
x
kk
ik
e
e
1
`
`
1
 
 
Specifically, Uji is the level of equity contribution j contracted to EJV partner firm i at JV 
formation time t. β is the vector of logistic regression coefficients and zit the vector of firm-
specific characteristics and controls relevant to EJV partner firm i at time t. The first term Pr (Y 
= 0) refers to the probability of the dependent variable taking the value of 0, reflecting a 
negotiated equity contribution less than 50 per cent. This case is the benchmark case for the 
multinomial logistic regressions. The second term, Pr (Y = j) captures the (log odds of the) 
probabilities of the dependent variable either taking a value of 1 indicating a 50 per cent equity 
contribution (Y = 1), or 2 signalling an equity contribution of more than 50 per cent (Y = 2), 
respectively. Multinomial logit uses maximum likelihood procedures to estimate such 
polytomous dependent variables. Note, the groups formed by the categories of a polytomous 
dependent variable are not independent. Multinomial logit handles dependency by estimating 
the models for all outcomes simultaneously except for one category which is left to serve as the 
baseline reference.  
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Equity contribution ji =       α + β 1 RDS 1,ti    + 2 SES 1,ti  + 3 SHC 1,ti  + 
β 4 TAS 1,ti   +  β 5 GPQ 1,ti  +  6 INDB 1,ti  + 
 β 7 GRT 1,ti  +  β 8 CHOI 1,ti  + 9 PRF 1,ti  + 
β 10 EXFN 1,ti  + 11 NDTX 1,ti  +  β 12 LSAL 1,ti   +  
13 UPS + 14 IND + 15 NAT + 16 YER + i   
 
All variables are defined previously and measured in the accounting year immediately prior to 
EJV formation. A one-year lag is used for a partner firm‟s characteristics, because using known 
information, the partner firm‟s characteristics prior to EJV formation is more appropriate in 
explaining each partner‟s equity contribution than variables relating to the year when the EJV is 
formed. The coefficients are estimated using the logistic procedures specified in Limdep, 
version 8. 
 
4.2  Sources of Data and Sample Description 
The data sample used in this paper draws on EJVs established by two partner firms in the 
UK during 1995-2000. One of the partners is always a non-UK firm so international equity joint 
ventures are analysed exclusively. The final sample incorporates 194 EJV partnerships. The 
analysis only considers UK-based EJVs as this enables us to control for the fact that a partner‟s 
negotiated equity contribution may be constrained by the regulatory and jurisdictional 
requirements of the country in which the EJV is located. Public announcements of EJVs are 
obtained using the SDC Platinum JV/Alliances database provided by Thomson Financial. This 
database is the industry standard for information on joint ventures/alliances, M&A, repurchases 
and more on a worldwide basis. Accounting and financial data for each partner is extracted from 
Thomson Datastream. For the analysis, dummy variables are used to control for the partner‟s 
industry on the basis of their four-digit SIC codes. After aggregating any sectors including fewer 
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than four firms, the following seven usable industry sectors are obtained: 1. electric, gas and 
sanitary services; 2. communications; 3. industrial and commercial machinery and computer 
equipment; 4. chemicals and allied products; 5. primary metal Industries; 6. petroleum refining 
and related Industries; 7. oil and gas extraction. The services, finance, insurance, and real estate 
industry, and wholesale and retail trade sectors were omitted from the analysis either because no 
financial data on, for example, R&D expenses were available during the sample period or 
because of the specific nature of their activities. 
The non-UK partners are distinguished on the basis of their respective region of origin 
using dummy variables. Within the sample, three regional categories can be drawn up: 
European, North American, and Asian. Of these, 33 per cent are North American partner firms, 
43 per cent Asian partner firms, and 24 per cent European partner firms. Summary diagnostic 
statistics for the sample of firms used here are provided in Exhibit 1. The skewness of some of 
the variables in the sample suggests the use of a log transformation to mitigate this effect. Table 
1 provides Pearson correlation coefficients for the sample, which guide the specification of the 
regressions. It should be noted that the regression results reported in the following tables do not 
include the estimated coefficient estimates for the year and regional dummies. Although 
empirical estimations that incorporate both year and regional dummies are conducted, these 
variables are never significant either individually or jointly (based upon a Wald test), so the 
results are not reported; they are, however, available from the corresponding author on request.  
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Table 1 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 RDS 1t  SES 1t  GRT 1t  PRF 1t  NDTX 1t  LSAL 1t  GHOI 1t  GPQ 1t  SHC 1t  EXFN 1t  TAS 1t  INDB 1t  
RDS 1t  1            
SES 1t  -0.430 1           
 (0.000)            
GRT 1t  -0.113 0.176 1          
 (0.187) (0.075)           
PRF 1t  0.055 0.304 0.056 1         
 (0.501) (0.020) (0.506)          
NDTX 1t  0.021 0.095 0.293 0.091 1        
 (0.796) (0.314) (0.013) (0.256)         
LSAL 1t  0.213 0.279 -0.105 0.324 0.184 1       
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.212) (0.010) (0.021)        
GHOI 1t  0.062 -0.018 -0.203 -0.076 -0.141 0.089 1      
 (0.453) (0.853) (0.015) (0.345) (0.077) (0.272)       
GPQ 1t  0.081 0.083 0.117 0.111 0.557 0.289 0.022 1     
 (0.366) (0.429) (0.187) (0.207) (0.003) (0.021) (0.802)      
SHC 1t  -0.030 0.239 0.021 0.102 0.104 0.311 -0.017 -0.207 1    
 (0.714) (0.011) (0.807) (0.213) (0.201) (0.023) (0.834) (0.017)     
EXFN 1t  0.068 -0.036 -0.009 -0.322 -0.021 -0.460 0.181 -0.058 -0.077 1   
 (0.434) (0.723) (0.914) (0.056) (0.804) (0.003) (0.032) (0.517) (0.364)    
TAS 1t  -0.218 0.131 0.297 0.207 0.264 0.257 -0.154 0.331 0.093 -0.108 1  
 (0.007) (0.163) (0.041) (0.009) (0.023) (0.001) (0.052) (0.020) (0.251) (0.201)   
INDB 1t  0.120 -0.014 -0.061 0.070 0.044 0.186 -0.043 -0.223 0.092 -0.137 -0.143 1 
 (0.145) (0.879) (0.469) (0.388) (0.573) (0.020) (0.593) (0.009) (0.264) (0.106) (0.069)  
Notes: The p-values are given in parentheses. All variables are defined in the text and measured at the end of the pre-EJV year.
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5. Discussion of the Empirical Results  
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the multinomial logistic regressions predicting the 
probabilities of the level of equity contribution in the sample of EJV partners. Table 3 augments 
the results of Table 2 by controlling for a partner‟s location in the production chain 
(upstream/downstream) in cases where a vertical EJV is identified. Overall, the findings can be 
interpreted as follows. Partners owning strategic assets are more likely to contribute 50 per cent 
or more of the equity capital in EJVs. Consistent with hypothesis 1a, Table 2 shows that the 
variable RDS (R&D intensity) as a measure of strategic assets is correctly signed and generally 
significant at the 10 per cent and 5 per cent levels when predicting the probability of a partner‟s 
equity contribution being equal to or greater than 50 per cent. Support is also found for the 
importance of the specific human capital (SHC), which is another measure of strategic assets. 
This variable is also significant at the 1 per cent to 10 per cent levels in predicting a 50 per cent 
or more equity contribution in Table 3 (which controls for value chain location). However, in 
specification 2 of Table 2, the SHC variable is only significant when predicting the probability of 
the equity contribution being at least 50 per cent. These results support the findings of previous 
empirical research (Bradley et al. 1984; Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989; Balakrishnan and Fox 
1993; Hosskisson et al. 1994) that R&D intensity and specific human capital are appropriate 
proxies for strategic assets.  
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Table 2 Results of the Multinomial Logit Regressions Using Measures of Strategic Assets 
 
Specification    1   2 
  Ex.sign Log(Py=1/Py=0) Ex.sign Log(Py=2/Py=0) Log(Py=1/Py=0) Log(Py=2/Py=0) 
Constant  -96.619  -34.789 -72.498 -49.814 
  (0.312)  (0.580) (0.243) (0.387) 
RDS + 20.677 + 12.996 18.779 56.231 
  *(0.058)  (0.267) *(0.088) **(0.032) 
SHC + 0.543 + 1.117 1.091 0.398 
  (0.522)  *(0.065) *(0.077) (0.449) 
TAS - -1.258 - -2.895 -3.792 -0.595 
  *(0.088)  *(0.077) **(0.012) (0.286) 
GPQ -  -  -4.969 -5.529 
     **(0.026) **(0.017) 
INDB - -0.915 - -0.261 -0.823 -3.537 
  (0.154)  (0.494) (0.217) *(0.089) 
NDTX - -4.59 - -44.468   
  (0.768)  **(0.048)   
CHOI + -1.252 + -0.007 -0.686 -0.103 
  (0.507)  (0.997) (0.821) (0.966) 
GRT + 32.003 + 46.51 31.486 38.693 
  (0.124)  **(0.024) *(0.057) **(0.019) 
PRF + 84.016 + 349.180 7.851 17.935 
  (0.367)  *(0.086) (0.847) (0.512) 
EXFN +  +  14.974 10.234 
     (0.262) (0.404) 
LSAL - -3.114 - -0.078   
  (0.391)  (0.975)   
Industry dummies   Yes   Yes  
Log likelihood function  -57.362   -64.391  
Restricted log likelihood  -87.237   -93.123  
Chi-squared (df)  59.749 (28)   57.466 (28)  
p-value of Chi-squared  0.008   0.004  
Predicted  68%   67%  
Naïve model  43%   42%  
McFadden‟s R2  0.342   0.309  
Notes: P values given in parentheses 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
In relation to the tangibility of assets, consistent with hypothesis 2a, the coefficient signs 
on TAS, GPQ and INDB are overwhelmingly negative as expected, and often significant at 
either the 5 per cent or 10 per cent level in all regressions predicting the effect of a decreasing 
likelihood of a 50 per cent or more equity contribution. Collectively, these results confirm the 
proposed negative relationship between asset tangibility (measured in terms of a partner firm‟s 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets, ratio of depreciation to total assets and ratio of a firm‟s 
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leverage to its industry average, respectively) and the extent of a partner‟s relative equity 
contribution to an EJV. These results also corroborate the view that physical assets are less 
specific than intangible assets (Titman and Wessels 1988; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt 1991; 
Harris and Raviv 1991; Rajan and Zingales 1995). Collectively, the results support the 
proposition that the greater the contribution in terms of strategic assets by a partner firm to an 
EJV, the higher the likelihood of a larger equity share being contracted to that partner. Finally, in 
relation to hypotheses 1b and 2b, the coefficient of the UPS variable is positive and significant at 
the 5 per cent level in Table 3. This provides some support for the contention embedded in 
hypotheses 1b and 2b that enhanced difficulties in measuring the value-added contribution of the 
downstream partner in the value chain increases the probability of a relatively increased equity 
contribution to the EJV and vice versa. The respective location of partners in vertical EJVs as 
well as their assets characteristics determine the level of their equity contribution. This result 
also complements Baker et al.‟s (2002) finding that larger equity ownership by the downstream 
partner can remove the temptation to renege on a rationally negotiated contract.  
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Table 3 Result of the Multinomial Logit Regressions Using Measures of Strategic Assets and 
Controlling for a Partner’s Position in the Value Chain 
    3   4 
 Specification Ex.sign Log(Py=1/Py=0) Ex.sign Log(Py=2/Py=0) Log(Py=1/Py=0) Log(Py=2/Py=0) 
Constant  -144.616  -133.336 -306.669 520.733 
  (0.758)  (0.493) (0.308) (0.588) 
RDS + 20.23 + 3.761 109.139 153.483 
  *(0.079)  (0.722) *(0.089) **(0.021) 
SHC + 2.197 + 3.846 0.123 1.186 
  **(0.032)  ***(0.002) (0.788) **(0.023) 
TAS - -3.384 - -4.989 -0.532 -2.253 
  *(0.086)  **(0.042) (0.409) **(0.026) 
GPQ -  -  (-0.471) (-4.612) 
     (0.797) **(0.021) 
INDB - -0.973 - -0.47 -1.645 -3.266 
  (0.375)  (0.619) (0.173) *(0.078) 
NDTX - 2.659 - -14.221   
  (0.855)  (0.240)   
GHOI + -2.924 + -0.585 -1.851 -2.286 
  (0.338)  (0.781) (0.459) (0.318) 
GRT + 10.818 + 4.727 27.312 30.788 
  (0.270)  (0.511) *(0.059) **(0.034) 
PRF + 32.526 + 64.703 175.63 128.312 
  (0.548)  (0.245) *(0.053) **(0.035) 
EXFN + 3.601 + 7.531   
  (0.724)  (0.477)   
LSAL -  -  -2.034 -1.321 
     (0.416) (0.560) 
UPS + 1.276 + 1.106 2.898 2.631 
  (0.359)  (0.858) **(0.041) **(0.044) 
Industry dummies  Yes   Yes  
Log likelihood function  -48.334   -43.054  
Restricted log likelihood  -75.893   -69.954  
Chi-squared(df)  53.843(30)   53.763(30)  
p-value of Chi-squared  0.009   0.017  
Predicted  73%   70%  
Naïve model  43%   42%  
McFadden‟s R2  0.363   0.385  
Notes: P values given in parentheses 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
With respect to the control variables in Tables 2 and 3, the coefficient signs on both the 
growth and profitability variables (GRT and PRF) are generally both positive and statistically 
significant (at the 10 per cent and 5 per cent levels) signalling a probability of the equity 
contribution by the respective partner being 50 per cent or more, although the significance of the 
PRF variable is removed in Table 2. The GRT variable enables a comparative analysis of the 
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effects of tangible (fixed assets) and other intangible investment (R&D intensity) on equity 
contribution. The significance of the variable PRF also provides additional evidence supporting 
the importance of transaction costs with regard to the preferred level of equity ownership 
(Gomes-Casseres 1989; Hennart 1991; Nakamura and Yeung 1994). The non-debt tax shield 
(NDTX) variable is significant at the 5 per cent level in Table 2 specification 1; the coefficient 
is, as expected, negative. This result supports the perspective that the non-debt tax shields 
associated with capital equipment and depreciation (an indicator of non-strategic resources) 
would suggest an inverse relationship between an EJV partner firm‟s level of non-debt tax 
shields and its equity contribution to an EJV. Nevertheless, other empirical findings on the 
effect of non-debt tax shield are mixed and even contradictory (Harris and Raviv 1991).  
With respect to other control variables, the dependency on external financing (EXFN) is 
positively signed, which is in line with expectations; however, it is not significant. The signs for 
both the variability of earning and partner firm size (CHOI and LSAL) variables are as 
expected. However, neither of these variables is ever significant. One possible explanation for 
these results is that these factors can be considered industrial features and, therefore, are 
captured by their corresponding industry group dummies. In all multinomial logit regressions, 
the industry dummy variables (not reported) are significant at the 10 per cent level for the major 
industry groups: electric, gas and sanitary services; communications; chemical and allied 
products. Overall, the multinomial logit regression specifications displayed in the tables are 
significant (at either the 1 per cent or 5 per cent level) according to the model Chi-squared 
statistic. The percentage of correctly predicted outcomes ranges from 67 per cent to 73 per cent. 
(The percentage of correctly predicted estimators in the naïve model is always around 40 per 
cent.) On the basis of the McFadden‟s R2, the most preferred regression specification is 
specification 4 in Table 3. 
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6. Conclusion 
The central conclusion of this study is that the contractual arrangements governing a 
partner firm‟s equity share in an EJV appears sensitive to the presence of agency hazards arising 
from the costs of monitoring specialized resources. It is argued that the inherent characteristics 
of the expertise and/or nature of the strategic assets that a firm contributes to an inter-firm EJV 
will often make it difficult for that firm to guarantee ex ante its future productive contribution 
during the negotiation stage. By choosing to collaborate through an EJV, each party effectively 
receives a subsequent financial return that is proportional to its ownership share of the venture‟s 
equity capital. The findings support the hypothesis that EJV partners owning strategic assets 
whose potential contribution to the success of the venture is the most difficult to measure ex 
ante will negotiate a higher share of equity capital. This equity share serves to partially 
guarantee their actions. The core finding is robust to a number of specifications relating to both 
the definition of strategic assets and other determinants of monitoring costs, such as the location 
of the partners in the value chain and other firm-level control variables. Agency costs appear to 
influence the magnitude of the contracted equity share in EJVs. A distinctive perspective to the 
contractual specifications governing EJV formation is, thereby, offered. 
This set of findings is relevant for EJV research along several dimensions. First, it 
indicates the salience of strategic assets as determinants of contractual structures in the EJV 
literature (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Dutta and Weiss 1997). As complementary 
research continues to explore the motives and determinants of equity participation in EJVs 
drawing upon perspectives from TCE and the bargaining literature (Gomes-Casseres 1989; 
1990; Hennart 1991; Nakamura and Yeung 1994; Brouthers and Bamossy 1997) the present 
findings demonstrate the value of giving attention to firm-level antecedents from other 
theoretical perspectives (Ramanathan et al. 1997). Second, this study contributes to the broader 
debate on the explanatory power and appropriate domain of agency theory (Aminhud and Lev 
1981, 1999; Denis et al. 1999; Lane et al. 1998, 1999) by providing empirical evidence 
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indicating that agency problems arising from costly measurement of specialized activities 
influence the ownership patterns in EJVs. Reuer and Ragozzino (2006) also find that agency 
hazards appear to influence investment in EJVs after accounting for the nature of firms‟ 
resources. Third, the finding that agency problems influence financial contracting arrangements 
complements prior conceptual research on equity ownership in EJV. These rationales have been 
largely positive and seen as being the least costly solution to the separation of ownership and 
control. They consider firms‟ equity participation in joint ventures to be determined by reasons 
such as competitive intensity, contractual duration, cultural distance, local partner state 
ownership, and country risk (Pan 1996; Chadee and Qiu 2001). The present perspective 
structured around agency theory, measurement costs and the cost of monitoring specialized 
activities, offers a distinct and enhanced view of the division of equity capital in EJVs.  
The findings here are consistent with those from other studies (see, for instance, Barzel 
and Suen (1992); Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart and Moore (1990) that invoke agency 
hazards in collaborative production to argue that ownership is endogenous rather than 
exogenous. In these models the allocation of residual rights of control affects prior investments 
in specific assets, and relative inefficiencies in investments determine ownership rights. The 
results also complement arguments (Eswaran and Kotwal 1985; Barzel and Suen 1992; 1997) 
that stress that under share contracts, such as joint ventures, rather than constraining agency 
hazard through monitoring, the partial residual claim given to each partner serves to economize 
on monitoring. Once it is recognized that the relative use of monitoring costs and residual 
claimancy to constrain agency hazards are determined endogenously, the implications of 
productivity differences and relative monitoring costs for contractual choice can be more readily 
obtained. However, the organizational implications of these principles remain incompletely 
explored. This paper contributes to that literature by extending these principles to an analysis of 
the negotiated equity contribution in EJVs.  
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The findings and limitations of the present study point to a number of new avenues for 
EJV research. Future studies might examine the relationship between agency theory and 
institutional concepts such as national cultural differences. Although the results of this study are 
also applicable to domestic joint ventures, it can be argued that there is scope for a comparative 
study between international and domestic joint ventures that allows for a multi-level analysis. 
This may provide additional insights into the implications of agency hazards and the relative 
importance of firm-level effects in the development and evolution of the EJV literature.  
The design and implementation of a resource-based strategy affects a firm‟s financial 
decisions in relation to its contribution to an EJV. A substantial amount of research, including 
this study, has now analysed the implications of partner-specific resources and residual 
claimancy for EJVs (Blodgett 1991; Gary and Yan 1992; Mjoen and Tallman 1997). However, 
considerably less is known about the compatibility of such contracting policy within the overall 
financial policy of a global firm. Future studies might also consider the extent to which the 
present analysis of strategic resources, equity shares and overall control has implications for the 
performance of EJVs. Finally, this study places significant emphasis upon the importance of 
financial contracting theories as explanations for the organizational forms adopted in 
international business which should be further explored. 
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